I propose the purpose our concept of actual causation serves is minimizing various cost in intervention practice. Actual causation has three features: non-redundant sufficiency, continuity and abnormality; these features correspond to the minimization of exploitative cost, exploratory cost and risk cost in intervention practice. Incorporating these three features, a definition of actual causation is given. I test the definition in 66 causal cases from actual causation literature and show that this definition' application fit intuition better than some other causal modelling based definitions.
Introduction
In the literature of actual causation, a question has been frequently asked: why do we possess this particular concept of actual causation? what kind of purpose does the concept of actual causation serve? Hitchcock and Knobe proposed that "people's concept of actual causation enables them to design effective interventions " 1 , i.e., actual causation concept help people to select the preferable intervention which "works by targeting abnormal aspects of the situation and replacing them with more normal ones".
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In this paper I offer a somehow different view of what kind of interventions are preferable: preferable interventions should satisfy non-redundant sufficiency, continuity and abnormality, because in satisfying these features the cost in intervention practice is qualitatively minimized. In the following part of introduction section I will explain more about cost in intervention practice.
In order to achieve some desired goal in real life, we need to make intervention or prediction of whether some previous events occurs or not. There are two types of these intervention/prediction activities: exploitative ones and exploratory ones.
No matter whether the goal-pursuing activity is exploitative or exploratory, generally the activity would have practical costs, i.e., certain amount of limited resource would be consumed during the activity. There are at least four kind of such practical cost.
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(1) Exploitative Cost. Sometimes the goal-pursuing activity is exploitative. People manipulate the presence or absence of some previous events to ensure the presence or absence of a following event. People collect information of the presence or absence of some previous events to predict the presence or absence of a following event. For instance, suppose I am to cook an egg for breakfast. I put an egg into boiling water and wait to obtain a boiled egg. I observe the flame color and timing to predict how tender the cooked egg will be. In short, in order to ensure the occurrence of an exploitative goal event, the agent should intervene with some cause-like event of the goal event, and the intervention activities have practical cost. For instance, in order to obtain a boiled egg, I do intervention with the egg, and the intervention activity consumes some electric energy, water and time.
(2) Exploratory Costs. Sometimes the goal-pursuing activity is exploitative. The goal of the activity is not to achieve a concrete physical outcome such as a cooked egg. Rather, the goal is to explore the world and extend our causal knowledge, to know more about which event causes some other event. For instance, I may do a serial of experiment to find the shortest time required to boil an egg. In this case, the goal of my experiments is not to cook a particular egg, but to explore the causal relationship between the egg boiling process and the processed egg. In short, in order to achieve some exploratory goals, the agent should run some actual or virtual experiment trials, and these experimental activities have practical cost. For instance, the 'fastest egg-boiling' experiment above cost electric energy, water and time. Even if the agent merely computes the shortest egg boiling time theoretically but doesn't actually run the experiment, the theoretical process would cost some computing resource and time.
(3)Risk Cost: When we use a specific set of intervention to promote some goal event, there is risk that the goal event failed to occur even if the intervention is done.
For instance, suppose I boil an egg for two minutes and pick it out, it is possible that the egg is still in semi-liquid state and uneatable. Then, the bad possibility that the boiled egg is uneatable is the risk cost I have to pay for the intervention of boiling the egg for two minutes.
(4) Normative Costs. If the intervention activity violate some practical/moral norm, the norm-violation aspect of the activity can be seen as the normative cost of the activity. Suppose My neighbor Jack and I share a kitchen. Only two eggs are left in the kitchen and they all belong to Jack. In the morning Jack boiled one for breakfast and I boiled the other without notifying jack. If we ask what causes the fact that Jack has no egg to use for lunch, we are more inclined to say my action in the morning rather than Jack's is the cause. The reason for this is that my egg-using activity violate a practical norm ("Not to use others' property without permission") and my neighbor's activity doesn't. In this paper I will not further address the issue of normative cost ,but simply assume that normative cost can be treated like risk cost is treated.
Because of the resource-limited nature of the real world, we have good reason to minimize the four kind of cost above. The cost minimization can be done either qualitatively or quantitatively.
On the qualitative level, the question is whether a particular set of event is both efficient and nonredundant in promoting a following event. Being efficient means intervention with this set of events somehow ensure the following event's occurrence.
Being nonredundant means that intervention with any subset of this event set doesn't ensure the following event as good as the original set.
On the quantitative level, for any two efficient and nonredundant intervention set A ⃗ ⃗ and B ⃗ ⃗ for some goal event e, if quantitative information of all relevant cost of both sets is available, the agent can quantitively compare A ⃗ ⃗ and B ⃗ ⃗ 's total cost and choose the one with less cost.
In most real scenarios we don't have detailed quantitative knowledge of the relevant intervention cost above. So epidemically what is more relevant to the concept of actual causation is the question of cost minimization on the qualitative level.
I propose that the question of qualitatively minimize intervention cost is closely linked to the concept of actual causality. I suggest that for a goal event Y = y, if an event set X ⃗ ⃗ = x ⃗ ensures Y=y with qualitative minimal cost in the four aspect above, then X ⃗ ⃗ = x ⃗ is a actual cause set for Y=y, and any conjunct X=x of X ⃗ ⃗ = x ⃗ is an actual cause of Y=y. Speaking of counterfactual scenarios, event set X ⃗ ⃗ = x ⃗ is actual cause set of event Y = y in scenario S if and only if, in all scenarios similar to S in structure, X ⃗ ⃗ = x ⃗ ensures event E = e and the cost of the intervention with X ⃗ ⃗ = x ⃗ is qualitatively minimal in the four aspect mentioned above.
In the following chapters, I will further elaborate this idea. In Chapter 2, I
introduce formalization in causality modeling and define what is a scenarios similar to the actual scenario S.
In Chapter 3, I discuss the Mackie 4 intuition that if event X = x causes Y = y, then
X=x should be a member of a nonredundant sufficient condition set of Y. I will show that this nonredundant sufficiency requirement is related to the minimization of exploitative cost.
In Chapter 4, I discuss the intuition that if event X = x causes Y = y, then there should be some specific causal chain between X=x and Y=y. I will show that this chain requirement is related to the minimization of exploratory cost.
In Chapter 5, I discuss the intuitive distinction between an event's key cause and its background conditions, i.e., the intuition behind causal selection which render causation somehow inegalitarian. I will show that this intuition is related to the minimization of risk cost.
In Chapter 6, I propose an definition of actual causation which combines the analysis of its previous chapters. I will apply this definition, Halpern and Hitchcock (2015) Only when the value setting of U ⃗ ⃗ is within a certain range can it ensure that the condition (3) of the simplified model definition is satisfied and that the simplified model M is locally deterministic. 9 We can call this specific range of value settings of U ⃗ ⃗ its deterministic range.
In other words, whenever 1 ⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗ ∈ Range'(U ⃗ ⃗ ), the values of all non-initial endogenous variables and dependent variables are only influenced by other endogenous variables and dependent variables, but not influenced by U ⃗ ⃗ 's value change inside Range'(U ⃗ ⃗ ).
Because this deterministic feature, We can fix these non-initial variable and dependent variable's structural function's exogenous arguments into some constant value, so that these structure functions don't contain exogenous variables any more.
With the concept of Deterministic Range, we can define two different criteria for "what is a causal scenario similar to scenario S ":
The two criterions for scenario similarity correspond to our two understanding of scenario similarity:
In Reliable Similar Scenarios of the actual scenario, the value setting of exogenous variables is sufficient to ensure that each endogenous variable acts according to its structural equation. We can regard the whole causal structure as a reliable machine which can process input and produce output regularly. For instance, suppose an agent is to use a new reliable typewriter to print the word "hello" on a piece of paper. The agent only needs to hit characters "hello" on the keyboard without worrying about the internal process of the typewriter, because he/she has good reason to assume the typewriter's internal process will work precisely according to its structural functions which are designed for typing-printing.
In General Similar Scenarios of the actual scenario, the value setting of exogenous variables is insufficient to ensure that each endogenous variable acts according to its structural equation. If the agent only know that a given scenario is generally similar to the actual scenario, but has no further knowledge to assure that the scenario is reliable similar to the actual scenario, then the agent needs to intervene with some endogenous variables to ensure that the variable follows their structural equation. We can regard the whole causal structure in the scenario as an worn-out machine whose internal parts do not necessarily follow the prescribed rules. In order to obtain desirable outcome with this machine, the agent needs not only to give correct input on the input-interface, but also to intervene with the internal parts to ensure they work appropriately. For instance, suppose the actor is to use a worn-out typewriter to print the word "hello" . He/she has to both hit "hello" on the keyboard and take some maintenance operations to ensure the typewriter work well.
Exploitative Cost and Sufficiency Requirement of Causation
With the causal modelling support of Chapter 2, we can investigate actual causation and start with the simplest kind of causal scenario.
Definition 3.1, Direct Connection Model. A simplified model M is a direct connection model of event E=e, iff M's endogenous variable set consists only of some event E=e and its structural function's argument set V E ⃗⃗⃗⃗ = {X 1 ， … ， X n } such that:
In other words, in this model, all endogenous variables other than E are directly linked to E through the structural function of E, and they are only affected by exogenous variables. The condition (1) above ensures that the strategy is efficient in producing E=e, and the condition(2) ensures that the strategy is nonredundant. Based on this strategy, we can define direct cause of a event.
Definition 3.2 Direct Cause Preliminary. In scenario (u ⃗ , M), event C = c is direct cause of event E = e, iff C = c belongs to a set S ⃗ = s and S ⃗ = s satisfies:
E=e; (3) no subset of S ⃗ = s satisfies both (1)and (2). We can call the set S ⃗ = s which satisfies (1)(2)(3) a direct cause set of E=e.
In scenarios more complex than direct connection scenarios, some events are indirectly connected to the effect event. Then, the question of how to determine a reasonable intervention strategy will depend on which kind of similar scenarios are relevant to the actual scenario and worth consideration. Following this distinction of the two criteria for scenario similarity, we can distinguish two kind of intervention strategy:
(1) Intervention in unreliable similar scenarios to the actual scenario. In this type of scenarios, the value setting of the exogenous variable is insufficient to ensure that each endogenous variable follows its structured equation. The agent needs to intervene with some endogenous variables to ensure these variables follow their structural equation.
This leads to the idea that there are two kind of intervention with an individual variable: value intervention and function intervention. In value intervention, the agent fixes the value of event variable X to X = x by intervention. In function intervention, the actor ensures that X's value assignment follows its structural function f x . For instance, in the worn-out typewriter case above, the agent should do both value intervention (e.g., typing on keyboard) and function intervention (e.g., do some internal maintenance to make the typewriter work well) to ensure his/her desired outcome.
We can use v ⃗⃗⃗ to denote the set of events that the agent does value intervention with, use ⃗⃗⃗ to denote the set of events the agent does function intervention with, and use Loss v (X = x) and Loss f (X = x) to denote the cost of value intervention and function intervention for event X = x. Then we can formulate the equation for an exploitative intervention strategy's total intervention costs:
If the agent wants to both ensure E=e and to minimize the intervention cost, adopting the intervention strategy below will be reasonable: We can call a set ⃗⃗⃗ = v ⃗⃗⃗ which satisfies (1) and (2) in proposition 3.3 an sufficient set for E = e in unreliable scenarios similar to (u ⃗ , M).
(2) Intervention in reliable scenarios. In this type of scenarios, the value setting of the exogenous variable is sufficient to ensure that each endogenous variable follows its structural function.
In cases where this type of scenarios is relevant, a reasonable intervention strategy for the agent is: Do value intervention to some ⃗⃗⃗ = ⃗⃗⃗ and do function intervention We can call a set S ⃗ = which satisfies (1) and (2) in proposition 3.4 an sufficient set for E = e in reliable scenarios similar to (u ⃗ , M).
Exploratory Cost and Continuity Requirement of Causation
In this chapter I discuss the chain feature of actual causation and show that this chain feature helps minimize exploratory cost.
I mentioned in the introduction that sometimes the goal we seek is exploratory, i.e., the goal is to explore the world and extend causal knowledge. A straight way to carry out this exploration is to actually or virtually test different sets of events to see whether intervention with these event set can ensure the effect event no matter how other events' value settings change. However, these actual or virtual tests have cost, such as the exploitative cost of intervention in each trial and the risk cost that some undesired events occur.
The following three reasoning operation (extrapolation operation, interpolation operation and flank operation) remarkably reduce the number and cost of tests that the agent need to try for exploration. To understand the three principles, I first define the concept of cause net:
Definition 4.1 Cause Net. For a scenario (u ⃗ , M) concerning event E=e:
(1) any direct cause set N ⃗⃗ = n ⃗ of E=e is a cause net of E=e.
(2) for any cause net N' ⃗⃗⃗⃗ = n ' ⃗⃗⃗⃗ of E=e, replace some member X=x of N' ⃗⃗⃗⃗ = n ' ⃗⃗⃗⃗ with one of X=x's direct cause set, the new set is also a cause net of E=e.
It can be proved that if N ⃗⃗ = n ⃗ is a cause net of E=e in (u ⃗ , M), then N ⃗⃗ = n ⃗ is a sufficient set for E=e in reliable scenarios of (u ⃗ , M). In other words, if all noninitial event variables follow their structural functions, intervention with N ⃗⃗ = n ⃗ can ensure E=e no matter how other initial variables change. With the concept of cause net , I
now introduce the three reasoning operations:
Interpolation Operation. Suppose S ⃗ = s is a cause net of E = e in scenario (u ⃗ , M) . Replace some member X=x of S ⃗ = s with a set H ⃗⃗ = h ⃗ , and H ⃗⃗ = h ⃗ should satisfy: for each direct cause chain {X=x, …, E=e} where each chain member is a direct cause of its successor, the successor of X=x is included in H ⃗⃗ = h ⃗ . This operation is a interpolation operation on (S ⃗ = s , = ). It can be proved that the new set S′ ⃗⃗ = s′ ⃗⃗ after replacement is an sufficient set in reliable scenarios of (u ⃗ , M).
Extrapolation Operation: Suppose S ⃗ = s is a cause net of E = e in scenario
(u ⃗ , M) . Replace some member X=x of S ⃗ = s with a one of X=x's sufficient set I = i .
This operation is a Extrapolation Operation on (S ⃗ = s , = ). It can be proved that
the new set S′′ ⃗⃗⃗⃗ = s′′ ⃗⃗⃗ after replacement is an sufficient set in reliable scenarios of (u ⃗ , M).
Flank Operation: Suppose S ⃗ = s is a cause net of E = e in scenario (u ⃗ , M) . Do a interpolation operation on (S ⃗ = s , = ) and get a new set S′ ⃗⃗ = s′ ⃗⃗ , then do a extrapolation operation on (S' ⃗⃗⃗ = s ' ⃗⃗⃗ , = ) for each Z∈S′ ⃗⃗ − S ⃗ . These serial of operations constitute a Flank Operation. the new set S′′′ ⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗ = s′′′ ⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗ after operation is an sufficient intervention set in reliable scenarios of (u ⃗ , M).
We can call the average length of all direct causal chains from S ⃗ = s members to E = e as the distance from S ⃗ = s to E = e. If S ⃗ = s is a cause net of E=e, then a sufficient set less distanced from E=e than S ⃗ = s can be acquired by interpolation operation, a sufficient set more distanced from E=e than S ⃗ = s can be acquired by extrapolation operation, and a sufficient set as distanced from E=e as S ⃗ = s may be acquired by a flank operation. Hence by using the three operations above, an agent can extend his/her causal knowledge without actual or virtual experiment trials.
There is some special connection between the interpolation operation and chain of direct causes. By definition, only events which belong to a direct cause chain toward E=e can replace others or be replaced in the interpolation operation. This means only events in direct cause chain to E=e can be start point or end point in an interpolation operation.
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Therefore, the within-direct-chain feature of an event is valuable for minimizing exploration cost. When an agent is to explore which events are causes of E = e, if he/she already knows that X = x is cause of E = e and there is a direct causal chain from X=x to E=e, then he/she don't have to actually or virtually test all the possible value settings of relevant variables one by one; the agent can simply start from the position X=x and use the three reasoning operations to explore outward, inward and sideways.
In other words, if the agent has three kind of knowledge: (1) So we have reason to take the chain feature as a requirement for actual causation:
Weak Continuity Requirement: if X = x is the cause of E = e, there is a a chain {X=x, …, E=e} such that each member in the chain is direct cause of its successor.
In most cases, when we say X=x is cause of E=e, the intuition demands not only that X=x belongs to some set S ⃗ = s which ensures E=e', but also that X=x belongs to some sets which ensures that E=e is caused in the way or routine that it is actually caused. In other words, it is demanded that there is at least a direct causal chain from
X=x to E=e and for each event Z=z in the chain, there is a set S z = s z which satisfies:
(1) X=x ∈S z ⃗⃗⃗ = s z ⃗⃗⃗ ; (2) S z = s z is nonrendundant sufficient set for Z=z. We can formulate a more strict requirement based on this intuition:
Strong Continuity Requirement: if X = x is cause of E = e, then there is set {X = x,..., E = e} which satisfies: (1) each member of the set is direct cause of its successor;
(2) for any member Z=z in this set, there is a set S z ⃗⃗⃗ = s z ⃗⃗⃗ , X=x ∈S z ⃗⃗⃗ = s z ⃗⃗⃗ , and S z ⃗⃗⃗ = s z ⃗⃗⃗ is a non-redundant sufficient set for Z=z.
Risk Cost and Abnormality Requirement of Causation
The phenomena of causal selectivity exists beyond the requirements in previous chapters. 11 We often take some events as key cause of an effect and take other events as background conditions. For instance, When a match is lit in the room, we tend to think movement of the match rather than presence of oxygen is cause of the fire, although in the structural function of the fire, Fire = Match & Oxygen, Match and
Oxygen's status is equal. When Jim is eating in the kitchen on the second floor, we generally don't not think the floor's being firm is a cause of Jim's survival, although strictly speaking, if the floor is not firm and cracks, Jim will fall and die.
Causal selectivity can be explained by minimization of risk cost. Suppose S ⃗ = s is a nonredundant sufficient set for E=e. If the agent desires E=e but fails to intervene with S ⃗ = s or part of S ⃗ = s , the agent faces the risk that E=e might not occur, but in the mean time, he/she saves the intervention cost for intervening with S ⃗ = s or part of it. If the risk cost is significantly lower than the intervention cost, there is good reason not to intervene with S ⃗ = s or its parts.
Quantitively, if we use Loss risk (S ⃗ = s ) to denote cost of the total risk that E=e might not occur if intervention with S ⃗ = s is absent, use Loss miss (S ⃗ = s ) to denote the cost of E's nonoccurrence in a particular scenario where S ⃗ ≠ s and E≠e, use S miss to denote the set of scenorios where S ⃗ ≠ s and E≠e, and use P(S) to denote the probability of a particular scenario S, their relationship is as below:
Formula 5.1, Loss for risk:
Loss risk (S ⃗ = s ) = Loss miss (S ⃗ = s ) * ∑ P(s) s∈S miss Halpern and Hitchcock (2015) proposed a requirement of causal selection for actual causation 12 and the requirement can be seen as a way to filter the events with low risk cost. Briefly speaking, Halpern and Hitchcock's idea is that if X ⃗ ⃗ = x ⃗ is cause of E=e in scenario (u ⃗ , M), then there should be some contrastive scenario S' where:
(1) X ⃗ ⃗ ≠ x ⃗ , (2) there is a set of variables whose members are all on paths from X ⃗ ⃗ to E, and all members in − X ⃗ ⃗ follow their structural function;(3) E≠e and (4) S' is at least as normal as the actual scenario S.
I revised Halpern&Hitchcock's requirement to make it work well with other requirement in previous chapters: The reason for using Intrinsic Scenario is: (1) since it is not specified how a simplified model M's endogenous variables V ⃗ ⃗ shall be selected, it might be the case that V ⃗ ⃗ contains many variables which are not relevant to the way how X ⃗ ⃗ influences E.
By creating an intrinsic Scenario, these variables are removed away. (2) the intrinsic scenario procedure helps to avoid some counter intuition application of definition 5.3.
According to the requirement above, if X ⃗ ⃗ = x ⃗ meets the requirement, there is at least one scenario S ' where intervention with X ⃗ ⃗ = x ⃗ is absent and the probability of E≠e is no less than the probability of E = e. Thus, at least in scenario S' it is reasonable to intervene with X ⃗ ⃗ = x ⃗ .
In contrast, if X ⃗ ⃗ = x ⃗ failed to meet the requirement, then for any scenario S'
E≠e, either S' is less probable than S so that the actual scenario S is no more an abnormal scenario, or the probability of S' is not comparable with that of S so that the agent is unable to judge whether the actual scenario S is an abnormal scenario.
The next question is , how to compare the probability of two scenarios without knowing the specific value of their probability? According to Bayesian network theory, for a causal scenario S containing ordered events {X 1 = x 1 , … , X n = x n }, the probability of this scenario 13 is:
Where PA i = pa I is the value setting of X i 's parent event set in S, i.e., the argument set of X i 's structural function.
When we are to compare the probabilities of two scenarios S = {X 1 = x 1 , … , X n = x n }, S '= {X 1 ′ = x 1 ′, … , X n ′ = x n ′}, both probabilities can be calculated in the way above mentioned:
Formula 5.4 Probability of Scenario
In everyday life, we often do not know the exact value of each P(Xi = xi |PA i = pa i ) in the right side of the formulas. However, usually the ordering of P(Xi = xi |PA i = pa i ) and P(Xi = xi ′|PA i = pa′ i ) is knowable:
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(1) Suppose X I is an initial endogenous variable in the model. If there is some value x i0 that for any x i in X i 's domain, P(x i0 ) ≥ P(x i ), x i0 usually would be seen as X I 's default value. Because PA i = {}, it can be implied that for any x i in X I 's domain,
(2) Suppose X I is an non-initial endogenous variable in the model. Let f xi (pa xi ) be X I 's value following its structural function. In reliable scenarios, for any x i in X I 's domain and any value setting of X I 's parents set pa ij , P(f xi (pa xij )|pa i ) >= P(xi'|pa ij ).
For two similar scenarios S and S ', if for any endogenous variables Xi ,P(X i = x i |PA i = pa i ) >= P(X i = x i ' |PA i = pa i '), 15 then due to Formula 5.3, P (S)> = P (S ').
Using the procedures above, if we know the default value of each initial variable and the structural function for each non-initial variable, we can compare any two scenarios S and S', and decide whether P (S) ≥ P (S′), P (S) <P (S '), or they are incomparable.
An Actual Causation Definition and Comparison with
Other Definitions I present a definition of actual causation by incorporating requirements of actual causation in previous chapters. ⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗ ] E ≠ e and the probability of the intrinsic scenario Si' of S' is no less than the probability of that of S.
(4) Continuity: there exist a ordered set of {C = c,..., E = e} which satisfies:
(a) each member in the set is direct cause of its successor.
(b) for any member Z=z in the set beside C, C=c and Z=z satisfies (1), (2) We can add a further requirement for intentional action to deal with these problems.
Requirement 6.5 Requirement for Intentional Action.
(1) Every intentional action B is composed of some intention event I=I and some following motion event A=a，and I is A's parent variable in the relevant model. From the view point of cost minimization, the disagreement above reflect such a question: when we are to consider whether to cancel intervening with some events to minimize intervention cost, should the object of the canceled intervention be an entire sufficient set or some single event in a sufficient set ?
In definition 6.2, the object of the canceled intervention is a sufficient set, i.e., we only consider whether cancelling intervention of such a set is desirable for cost minimization. If we make some revision to definition 6.2 and change the object of canceled intervention to some single event, the Abnormality Condition of definition 6.2 becomes:
(3') Abnormalities: there exist a scenario S' where (u ⃗ , M)╞ [C = c ′ ≠ c, W ⃗⃗⃗ = w '' ⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗ ] E ≠ e and the probability of the intrinsic scenario Si' of S' is no less than the probability of that of S.
In the alternative of Definition 6.2 by replacing (3) with (3'), generally omissions will no longer be considered cause. Therefore, my actual causation theory can also explain people's intuitive disagreement in cause by omission. But according to my theory, the essence of the disagreement is disagreement in how to think of the object of canceled intervention, i.e., disagreement in whether the proper object should be a sufficient set of the effect event or a single event in such a set.
Appendix I: Proof of Interpolation Operation Principle
Proposition: Suppose S ⃗ = s is a cause net of E = e in a reliable scenario (u ⃗ , M) .
Replace some member X=x of S ⃗ = s with a set H ⃗⃗ = h ⃗ , and H ⃗⃗ = h ⃗ should satisfy: for each direct cause chain {X=x, …, E=e} where each chain member is a direct cause of its successor, the successor of X=x is included in H ⃗⃗ = h ⃗ . The new set after replacement S′ ⃗⃗ = s′ ⃗⃗ is an sufficient set in reliable scenarios.
Proof:
1, Partition S dir ⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗ = s dir ⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗ into S 1 ⃗⃗⃗ = s 1 ⃗⃗⃗ ⊆ S ⃗ = s and S 2 ⃗⃗⃗ = s 2 ⃗⃗⃗ ⊆ S ex ⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗ − S ⃗ = ⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗ − .Let the expression 'A ensure B' be short for A is a sufficient set for B.
2, if X=x is direct cause of E=e, then E = e will be added into S 1 ⃗⃗⃗ = s 1 ⃗⃗⃗ , and {E = e} ensure its own occurrence.
3, if X=x is not direct cause of E=e, then:
3.1, , S′ ⃗⃗ = s′ ⃗⃗ ensures S 1 ⃗⃗⃗ = s 1 ⃗⃗⃗ . Because, since X = x is not member of S dir ⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗ = s dir ⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗ , the relation S 1 ⃗⃗⃗ = s 1 ⃗⃗⃗ ⊆ S′ ⃗⃗ = s′ ⃗⃗ would still hold after deleting X=x from S′ ⃗⃗ = s′ ⃗⃗ .
3.2, S′ ⃗⃗ = s′ ⃗⃗ ensures S ex ⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗ − S ⃗ = ⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗ − , hence S′ ⃗⃗ = s′ ⃗⃗ ensures S 2 ⃗⃗⃗ = s 2 ⃗⃗⃗ . This is because,for any variable Z=z in S ex ⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗ − S ⃗ , either X=x is an ancestor in some direc cause chain to Z=z or not, S′ ⃗⃗ = s′ ⃗⃗ ensures Z=z :
3.2.1, if X=x is an ancestor in some direct cause chains to Z=z, then for any of these chains, during the interpolate operation either Z or some variable between X=x and Z=z in the chain is added into S′ ⃗⃗ = s′ ⃗⃗ , and it can be recursively proved that S′ ⃗⃗ = s′ ⃗⃗ ensures Z=z.
3.2.2, if
X=x is not an ancestor in some direct cause chain to Z=z, then the value of Z won't be influenced by X=x's being removed.
